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STATEMENT OF NATURE OP PROCEEDING
Respondent agrees with defendant's statement of the
Nature of the Case as far as it goes, but defendant failed to
include that the issue of remedy is one of law not fact and the
writ of Error coram nobis is an improper basis to correct the
alleged wrong claimed by the defendant/ since this special writ
is to correct a mistake of fact, usually when a material fact was
unknown or when the fact could not have been ascertained with
reasonable diligence.

It is not intended to provide review by

appeal where the complaining party has not sought to appeal, or
the time for appeal has expired, or a prior appeal has been
abandoned*

Defendant's case further ignores the issue that no

one can waive the duty of support of a natural parent for a child
except in the case of adoption of said child or termination of
parental rights or duties in appropriate cas^s.

STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District court has continuing

jurisdiction sufficient to modify a divorce dtecree and order
support of a natural father for a child when there has been a
change of circumstances, not apparently contemplated by the
parties or the court, and state welfare has provided said
support*
2.

Whether the defendant can raise an issue of law,

the question of a modification of a divorce decree, by an

3

extraordinary writ of error coram nobisf when the time for appeal
has passed and further, when an earlier appeal on the merits was
dismissed by defendant.
3.

Whether the District court should have granted a

writ of error coram nobis, (assuming arguendo that this writ was
proper) as requested by defendant below, when in fact tne
defendant on the merits of his case as to a motion to modify the
decree of divorce and subsequent legal proceedings could have:
a.

Filed a special appearance to contest jurisdiction

of the District court to act.
b.

Directly contested the subsequent garnishment

proceedings, or additionally attacked the court's jurisdiction.
c.

Maintained the early appeal from the District court

action rather tnan dismissing the same (T120).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The State of Utah on January 14, 1985, and the

defendant appearing through counsel, argued against a motion of
the State of Utah to set aside an earlier order of the District
Court entered July 26, 1984.
2.

The July 26, 1984 order from Judge J. Dennis

Frederick was a reversal of a previous order entered by the
Commissioner Sandra Peuler on May 9, 1984, denying the
defendant's motion to set aside and vacate a prior support order
modifying a divorce decree of May 7, 1974, and ordering the
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defendant to pay One Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($150.00)
per month support.
3.

In November/ 1981, the defendant brought a motion

to set aside the 1978 orderf which motion was denied.

The

defendant appealed that order, but subsequently dismissed his own
appeal (T120).
4.

The defendant subsequently stipulated with the

Office of Recovery Services to pay support and entered a
voluntary wage assignment to make these payments in 1982.
5.

Commissioner Sandra Peuler denied the defendant's

February 27, 1984 motion to set aside the prior support order of
August 23, 1978.
6.

On or about April 23, 1984, defendant's motion for
I
a writ of error was argued before Commissioner Sandra Peuler by
counsel.
7.

On or about Hay 9, 1984, Commissioner Peuler

entered her recommendation that defendant's motion should be
denied.

The recommendation also stated that counsel should

advise if a special setting was necessary.
8.

On or about June 26, 1984, counsel for defendant

appeared ex parte before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and
obtained an order rejecting Commission Peuler's recommendation
and granting defendant's motion setting aside the support order
of August 23, 1978, previously entered.
9.

The ex parte hearing held before the court on June

26, 1984, was alleged by plaintiff to be in etror as defendant
failed to serve proper notice upon the plaintiff.
5

10.

The State of Utah, Department of Social Services,

was joined as a party in this particular action since June, 1978
and at all times had been represented by the Salt Lake County
Attorney1s office, and said County Attorney's office received no
notice as set forth above.
11.

Plaintiffs alleged defendant's present counsel

failed to comply with Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in
District Court, in that he failed to serve a copy of the proposea
order on opposing counsel before presenting it to the District
Court Judge Frederick for signature.
12.

Plaintiff's counsel, thereafter argued that

defendant's motion for writ of error should be barred under the
doctrine of res judicata, because in November, 1981, the
defendant brought a similar motion to set aside the 197 8 support
order which motion was denied.

Defendant's counsel appealed the

197 8 order, but subsequently dismissed the appeal in the Supreme
Court, as aforesaid.
13.

Plaintiff's counsel, the Salt Lake County

Attorney's office, had no actual notice of the order of Judge
Frederick entered July 26, 1984 reversing the finding and order
of Commissioner Peuler until December 12, 1984.
14.

This motion of the plaintiff's referred to in

paragraph 1, was set for hearing before Judge Frederick and after
due consideration, the court vacated the previous order of July
26, 1984, denied defendant's Motion for Writ of Error and For
Reimbursement of Funds, and affirmed the recommendations of
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Commissioner Peuler made May 9, 1984, This was the order entered
March l f 1985 (T185) by Judge Frederickr frpm which this appeal
is taken.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District court's order of March/ 1985 denying
defendant's Motion for a Writ of Error; denying defendant's
request for reimbursement and affirming Commissioner Peuler's
recommendations of May 9f 1984 should be affirmed by this court
for tne following reasons:
1.

The District court has continuing jurisdiction over

domestic relation casesf and can modify decrees of divorce as may
be required.
2.

Plaintiff served defendant by mail with its order

to show cause why the decree snould not be modified and defendant
admits that he had actually received process.

Actual notice of

the modification of Civil No. D13163 was sent August 22/ 1978 to
defendant at Box 41, Nettie/ West Virginia/ and no appeal was
taicen/ no special appearance to contest jurisdiction was taken by
defendant.
3.

The District court's denial of defendant's Motion

to Vacate the Modification of the Divorce Decree in 1981 was
appealed but the defendant dismissed the appeal.
4.

This action/ an appeal from a TJiird District

Court's denial of a "Motion For Writ of Error and for
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Reimbursement of Funds Paid Welfare Department" is an action to
remedy matters that could have been cured earlier at a previous
time when the merits of the case were before the District court.
The issue now is not one of facts, not appearing on the
face of the record or unknown to the court or to the parties,
such that being known, would have prevented trie rendition and
entry of an order, therefore this is not a correct matter for a
writ of error coram nobis, and the appeal should be dismissed.

ARGUMENT
A WRIT OF ERROR CORAH NOBIS IS THE IMPROPER
REMEDY FOR DEFENDANT AND THE APPEAL BASED
THEREON SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
1.

It is improper for defendant to bring this appeal

based on a denial of the District court to grant a writ of error
"coram nobis" to correct what is claimed an invalid modification
of the divorce decree as to support.
2.

The case of Nevada Welfare Division v. Vine, 1983

Nevada, 662 P.2d 295, U.S. Sup. Ct. 83, certiorari denied 11-7-83
1T16 8) does not apply to this appeal because it is the wrong
procedure.

If this action were the previous appeal on the issue

of modification, or on a special appearance to attack the
jurisdiction of the lower court to modify a previous divorce
decree then perhaps the Vine case could be considered.

However,

the issue before the court is one of law, not fact, and is not
correctable through the use of a writ "coram nobis" at this
juncture.

There is a difference between a writ of error and a

writ of error coram nobis.
8

"A writ of error is distinguishable for a writ of error
coram nobis* . . in that the purpose of the former is
to remove the record to a superior court for review of
errors of law appearing on the face thereof. . . while
the principle office of the latter is to enable the
court rendering judgment to reconsider it, and grant
relief from errors of fact not appearing on the face of
the record when the same is still before such court. 4
CJS 76 § 9 Appeal and Error Note 91.
"The writ lies for the purpose of obtaining a review of
a judgment by the same court which rendered it with
respect to some error of fact affecting the validity or
regularity of the judgment. The writ is used to obtain
a review by the court of its own judgment as
distinguished from a review by an appellate court. The
writ lies to review a judgment for error of fact as
distinguished from error of law. It does not lie for
defenses available at the trial. It lies for error of
fact not appearing on the face of the record, which
fact was unknown to the court, and which if it had been
known would have prevented the rendition and entry of
the judgment. . . the writ lies not for some unknown
fact going to the merits of the cage but for some
unknown fact going to right of the court to proceed and
which defeats the power of the court to attain a valid
result in the proceeding. 4 CJS 8^, Mathis v. U.S., DC
NC, 246 F.Sup. 116.
Thomas v. State, 190 So.2d 542 is a criminal case where
defendant was convicted in 1959 of carnal knowledge of a girl
under twelve years of age, and sentenced to prison for twentyfive years.
Defendant filed a writ of error cor&m nobis claiming
error for failure of defendant to have proper counsel at nunc pro
tunc proceedings and also claiming irregularities in service of a
copy of an indictment on defendant.

The court held:

As stated in Horsley v. State, 42 Ala.App. 567, 172
So.2d 56:
"Coram nobis is not a plenipotentiary mission to retry
indictments: it is a carefully guarded engine to root
out egregious fraud or collusion leading to a judgment.
Willis v. State, 42 Ala.App.85, 152 So.2d 883; Duncan
v. State, 42 Ala.App. 111,154 So.2d 302."
9

Nor is the writ of error coram nobis intended to
provide a review by appeal where the complaining party
has not sought to appeal and the time for appeal has
long since expired, Thomas v. State, 274 Ala. 531, 150
So.2d 387, supra.
The omission in the original judgment of a showing that
Thomas had not been served with the indictment, and of
a showing of allocutus, now complained of in tne
present petition, could have been reviewed, and if
erroneous, corrected on appeal.
Regardless of the correction of the judgment in the
nunc pro tunc proceedings, the points now raised by
Thomas could not have benefited him on an appeal of the
original judgment.
There was no fraud in the original trial, nor any
collusive act unknown to the defendant Thomas in his
original trial perpetrated on him by the state, nor any
overt matter which would have prevented trie entry of
the original judgment. See Willis v. State, 42
Ala.App. 85, 152 So.2d 883.
It follows that the matters sought to be raised by
Thomas in this most recent coram nobis proceedings were
not of a nature to be within the scope of such
proceedings. Tfte lower court therefore correctly
dismissed the petition.
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF LAW,
THE QUESTION OF A MODIFICATION OF A DIVORCE
DECREE, BY AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF ERROR
CORAM NOBIS, WHEN THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS
PASSED AND FURTHER, WHEN AN EARLIER APPEAL
ON THE MERITS WAS DISMISSED BY DEFENDANT.
3.

In this case defendant merely alleges efforts to

obtain counsel, to appeal and to attack an alleged improper
judgment and garnishment, but he fails to document times and
circumstances specifically to justify a cnange of the judgment
and states no undiscovered or unknown fact that should justify a
vacating of the previous order of support modification.
People v. Gennaitte, 274 P.2d 169 127 C.A. 2d 544
states:

10

"It is essential that applicant fdr relief in the
nature of a writ of error coram nobis state in his
motion both the probative facts on which his claims
restf and the time and circumstances under which such
facts were discovered/ so that court can determine
whether he has exercised due diligence; and the mere
allegation of ultimate facts or legal conclusion of
diligence is insufficient."
4.

The record is wholely absent of any factual data as

to why the 1981 appeal was dismissed by defendant or what
material fact is now known that was not known before, and this
further demonstrates the inappropriateness of the use of writ of
error coram nobis.

Townsend v. Boatmens National Bank, Mo. App.

148 S.W.2d 87.
5.

Coram nobis is a review by the same court to

correct its own judgment for errors of fact, not law, as
distinguished from a review by an appellet court.

Pryor v.

Woodall Industries, Inc., 167 So.2d 920, 922, 250 Miss. 672.
6.

This appeal should not be allowed for defendant to

attempt cure of a procedural or jurisdictional error which was
subject of remedy in a proceeding prior in time to this appeal.
People v. Tuthill 198 P.2d 505, 506, 32 Cal.2d 819.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY A DIVORCE DECREE AND ORDER
SUPPORT OF A NATURAL FATHER FOR A CHILD WHEN
THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND
STATE WELFARE HAS PROVIDED SAID SUPPORT.
7.

In section 78 45-1 to 9.2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended,

Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act requires natural parents
to support their children.
right not his parentfs.

A child1s right to support is his own

Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895.

This court has further held that a father had to pay child
11

support after the child reached twenty-one (21) years of age
where the child was retarded and incapable of self-support.
Garrard v. Garrard 1980f 570 P.2d 422.
Title 78-45b-l through 22 U.C.A. 1953 as aunended,
Public Support of Children Actf empowers the plaintiff to seek
reimbursement from people like the defendant, when the
responsibility of child support is thrown on the State and the
welfare division is obligated to seek reimbursement.

The

stipulation at the time of divorce states the defendant ma^.
(emphasis ours) be required to give up his rights to the yet
unborn child and may require plaintiff to waive rignts to child
support.

Here, there was no adoption as contemplated and support

burden fell to the state.

This was a change of circumstances and

the defendant was notified of the state's order to show cause in
June, 1978 and the notice of a hearing on August 16, 1978. His
failure to respond adequately to protect what ne now perceives
his rights or privileges, is not adequate to sustain this appeal
and the same should be dismissed.
8.

In paragraph #18 of defendant's motion of February

27, 1984, counsel makes mention of a hearing in the original
divorce action, however, the record clearly shows (attachments a,
b, c, d to appellants brief) the work of Attorney Reagan was a
Stipulation and default divorce and the only hearing was a brief
one before Judge Marcellus Snow based on a stipulation of
parties.

This is factually different than the Vine case. We

think it is proper to note that the child was not represented and
it proper to ask who can waive a child's right to support.
12

In

addition, it might be observed that at the time of the hearing of
the divorce action, no one raised the question of who should
support the child if there were no adoption, nor did anyone raise
the question as to whether the child's right to future support
could be waived, and if so, by whom and under what circumstances.

CONCLUSION
This matter came before the District court (T135) on a
Motion to Vacate an Order of Support due to child support paid by
the Utah Department of Social Services subsequent to a divorce
decree which declared that defendant had no duty to pay support.
The order of 1981 denying defendant's relief was appealed and the
appeal was subsequently dismissed by the defendant.

On

defendant's ex parte motion at a subsequent court hearing, the
recommendations of the court commissioner were reversed, claiming
the support order was in error.

Pursuant t^ Rule 60b(5)(7) Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, the State of Utah, Department of Social
Services through the County Attorney's offiqe, moved to vacate
the order entered by the court on July 26, 2J984, which order
reversed the findings of the Commissioner.

After a hearing on

the motion, an order to vacate the July 26, 1984 order was
entered by Judge J. Dennis Frederick on Mardh 1, 1985.
Defendants lodged this appeal based on the court's refusal to
grant an order vacating of the 197 8 support order on a theory
that a writ of error coram nobis was appropriate.
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Plaintiff requests a dismissal of this appeal as the
writ of error coram nobis is an improper procedural vehicle to
correct what defendant perceives as his rights.

Defendant has a

continuing obligation to support his natural offspring and it is
the child's right, not the parents, to be supported and said
support may be ordered based on the change of circumstances as
here occurred after the child was born, subsequent to the
divorce, and where said support was provided by the state agency
in absence of the defendant.

Defendant has wholely failed to

show any facts, hidden or not discoverable prior to this appeal
that would justify the court in granting the defendants1 motions.
All recommendations of the commissioner and final orders of the
District court are based on proper procedure and law and
plaintiff cannot here be granted any relief on appeal.
Defendants1 problem arises from his failure to contest the 197 8
motion and order to show cause, to properly proceed relative to
his appeal of 1981, his voluntary wage assignment of 1982 and
support payments thereunder.

There is no impropriety in

procedure or fact by the plaintiff herein, accordingly, plaintiff
respectfully requests this appeal be dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

2RNARD M. V£AN1
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-5261
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I hereby certify that I mailed foiir true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to:
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Attorney for Defendant
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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day of
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